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Abstract
We study the problem of interactive function computation by multiple parties possessing a single bit
each in a differential privacy setting (i.e., there remains an uncertainty in any specific party’s bit even
when given the transcript of the interactions and all the other parties’ bits). Each party is interested
in computing a function, which could differ from party to party, and there could be a central observer
interested in computing a separate function. Performance at each party and the central observer is
measured via the accuracy of the function computed. We allow for an arbitrary cost function to measure
the distortion between the true and the computed function value. Our main result is the exact optimality
of a simple non-interactive protocol: each party randomizes (sufficiently) and publishes its own bit. In
other words, non-interactive randomized response is exactly optimal. Each party and the central observer
then separately compute their respective function to maximize the appropriate notion of their accuracy
measure. The optimality is very general: it holds for all types of functions, heterogeneous privacy
conditions on the parties, all types of cost metrics, and both average and worst-case (over the inputs)
measures of accuracy. Finally, the optimality result is simultaneous, in terms of maximizing accuracy at
each of the parties and the central observer.
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1 Introduction
Multi-party computation (MPC) is a generic framework where multiple parties share their information
interactively amongst themselves towards a goal of computing some function (potentially different at each
of the parties) of the information. The challenges are in computing the functions efficiently (to minimize the
communication complexity) and/or in computing the functions such that parties learn nothing more about
the others’ information than can be learnt from the output of the function computed (this topic is studied
under the rubric of secure function evaluation (SFE)). These are classical topics: state of the art of the
communication complexity formulation is archived in [30]; the SFE formulation has been extensively studied
with the goal of characterizing which functions can be securely evaluated [39, 2, 20, 10]. One drawback of
SFE is that depending on what auxiliary information the adversary might have, disclosing the exact function
output might reveal each party’s data. For example, consider computing the average of the data owned by
all the parties. Even if we use SFE, a party’s data can be recovered if all the other parties collaborate. To
ensure protection of the private data under such a strong adversary, we want to impose a stronger privacy
guarantee of differential privacy.
Recent breaches of sensitive information about individuals due to linkage attacks prove the vulnerability
of existing ad-hoc privatization schemes, such as anonymization of the records. In linkage attacks, an
adversary matches up anonymized records containing sensitive information with public records in a different
dataset. Such attacks have revealed the medical record of a former governor of Massachusetts [37], the
purchase history of Amazon users[6], genomic information [24], and movie viewing history of Netflix users
[33]. Differential privacy is a relatively recent formulation that has received considerable attention as a
formal mathematical notion of privacy that provides protection against such strong adversaries (a recent
survey is available at [15]). The basic idea is to introduce enough randomness in the communication so that
an adversary possessing arbitrary side information and access to the entire transcript of the communication
will still have some residual uncertainty in identifying any of the bits at one of the parties. The requirement is
strong enough that non-trivial functions will be computed only with some error. Thus, there is a great need
for understanding the fundamental tradeoff between privacy and accuracy, and for the design of corresponding
privatization mechanisms and communication protocols that achieve the optimal tradeoffs. This is the focus
of this paper in the MPC context where each of the honest-but-curious parties possesses a single bit of
information.
We study the following problem of multi-party computation under differential privacy: each party pos-
sesses a single bit of information; the information bits are statistically independent. Each party is interested
in computing a function, which could differ from party to party, and there could be a central observer (ob-
serving the entire transcript of the interactive communication protocol) interested in computing a separate
function. Performance at each party and the central observer is measured via the accuracy of the function
computed. We allow an arbitrary cost metric to measure the distortion between the true and the computed
function value. Each party has a differential privacy constraint on its information bit (the privacy level could
be different from party to party) – i.e., there remains an uncertainty in any specific party’s bit even to an
adversary that has access to the transcript of the interactions and all the other parties’ bits. The interactive
communication is achieved via a broadcast channel that all the parties and the central observer can hear (this
modeling is without loss of generality – since the differential privacy constraint protects against an adversary
that can listen to the entire transcript, the communication between any two parties might as well be revealed
to all the others). It is useful to distinguish between two types of communication protocols: interactive and
non-interactive. We say a communication protocol is non-interactive if a message broadcasted by one party
does not depend on the messages broadcasted by any other parties. In contrast, interactive protocols allows
the messages at any stage of the communication to depend on all the previous messages.
Our main result is the exact optimality of a simple non-interactive protocol in terms of maximizing
accuracy for given privacy levels: each party randomizes (sufficiently) and publishes its own bit. In other
words:
non-interactive randomized response is exactly optimal.
Each party and the central observer then separately compute their respective decision functions to maximize
the appropriate notion of their accuracy measure. The optimality is very general: it holds for all types of
functions, heterogeneous privacy conditions on the parties, all types of cost metrics, and both average and
2
worst-case (over the inputs) measures of accuracy. Finally, the optimality result is simultaneous, in terms
of maximizing accuracy at each of the parties and the central observer. Each party only needs to know its
own desired level of privacy, its own function to be computed, and its measure of accuracy. Optimal data
release and optimal decision making is naturally separated.
The key technical result is a geometric understanding of the space of conditional probabilities of a given
transcript: the interactive nature of the communication constrains the space to be a rank-1 tensor (a special
case of Equation (6) in [35] and perhaps implicitly used in [29]; the two-party analog of this result is in [28]),
while differential privacy imposes linear constraints on the singular vectors of this tensor. We characterize
the convex hull of such manifolds of rank-1 tensors and show that their corner-points exactly correspond
to the transcripts that arise from a non-interactive randomized response protocol. This universal (for all
functionalities) characterization is then used to argue that both average-case and worst-case accuracies are
maximized by non-interactive randomized responses.
This geometric understanding leads to the novel linear program formulation of (16) and (19). Formulating
utility maximization under differential privacy as linear programs has been previously studied in [32, 19, 5,
22, 18, 17], under the standard client-server model where there is a single data publisher and a single
data analyst. These approaches exploit the fact that both the differential privacy constraints and the
utilities are linear in the matrix representing a privatization mechanism. Such a naive approach fails in this
multi-party context, since multi-party protocols must satisfy additional non-linear constraints, namely the
matrix describing the protocol must be compatible with multi-party (possibly interactive) communications.
Mathematically, these constraints translate into certain rank constraints on higher order tensors, which are
notoriously difficult to handle. The resulting maximization problem is non-linear and non-standard, i.e. the
rank-1 constraints are not convex. Nevertheless, we introduce innovative linear program formulations of the
problem, while paying the price in the increased complexity: the linear program is now infinite dimensional.
Perhaps surprisingly, we prove that this infinite dimensional linear program has a simple optimal solution
which we call randomized response, by exploiting the geometric understanding of the manifold of rank-1
tensors. Upon receiving the randomized responses, each party can compute the best approximation of its
respective function. A similar technique of transforming a non-linear optimization problem into an infinite
dimensional LP has been successfully applied in [25], where optimal privatization mechanisms under local
differential privacy has been studied.
Our main result shows that the optimal solutions of these infinite dimensional linear programs are at
the corner points of the manifold of rank-1 tensors, which exactly correspond to the transcripts that arise
from a non-interactive randomized response protocol. When the accuracy is measured via average accuracy,
both the objective and the constraints are linear and it is natural to expect the optimal solution to be at
the corner points (see Equation (16)). A surprising aspect of our main result is that the optimal solution is
still at the corner points even though the worst-case accuracy is a concave function over the protocol P (see
Equation (18)).
This work focuses on the scenario where each party possesses a single bit of information. With multiple
bits of information at each of the parties, the existence of a differentially private protocol with a fixed
accuracy for any non-trivial functionality implies the existence of a protocol with the same level of privacy
and same level of accuracy for a specific functionality that only depends on one bit of each of the parties
(as in [21]). Thus, if we can obtain lower bounds on accuracy for functionalities involving only a single
bit at each of the parties, we obtain lower bounds on accuracy for all non-trivial general functionalities.
However, non-interactive communication is unlikely to be exactly optimal in this general case where each
party possesses multiple bits of information, and we provide a further discussion in Section 4.
Related Work. In the context of two parties, privacy-accuracy tradeoffs have been studied in [31, 21] where
a single function is computed by a “third-party” observing the transcript of the interactive protocol. [31]
constructs natural functions that can only be computed very coarsely (using a natural notion of accuracy)
as compared to a client-server model (which is essentially the single party setting). [21] shows that every
non-trivial boolean functionality always incurs some loss of accuracy for any non-trivial privacy setting.
Further, focusing on the specific scenario where each of the two parties has a single bit of information,
[21] characterizes the exact accuracy-privacy tradeoff for AND and XOR functionalities; the corresponding
optimal protocol turns out to be non-interactive. However, this result was derived under some assumptions:
only two parties are involved, only the central observer computes an approximation of a function, the function
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has to be either XOR or AND, symmetric privacy conditions were used for both of the parties, and accuracy
was measured only as worst-case over the four possible inputs. Further, their analysis technique does not
generalize to the case when we have more than two parties. To this end, we provide a new analysis technique
of transforming the rank constrained optimization problem into a linear program, and give the exact optimal
protocols for any number of parties, any function of interest, heterogeneous privacy requirements, and both
average and worst-case accuracy measures. Among other things, this fully recovers the main results of [21]
and does it with a more efficient protocol as discussed in Section 3.2.
While there is a vast literature on differential privacy in a variety of contexts, exact optimality results are
very few. In an early result, [19] shows that adding discrete Laplacian noise to scalar count queries (which
are a special case of integer functionalities with sensitivity one) is universally optimal in terms of maximizing
the average accuracy for any cost metric that is monotonic in the error. While such universal mechanisms do
not exist in terms of maximizing average accuracy [5], recent work [17, 18] construct a class of mechanisms
(termed as “staircase” mechanisms) that are universally optimal in terms of maximizing worst-case accuracy
for any cost metric that is monotonic in the error. Demonstrating a fundamental equivalence between binary
hypothesis testing and differential privacy, [34] derives data processing inequalities for differential privacy
that are used to derive optimal composition theorems (characterization of how privacy degrades due to
interactive querying). These techniques are also useful in the results derived in this paper.
The study of accuracy-privacy tradeoffs in the MPC context was first initiated by [1] (addressed in a
more general context earlier in [16]) which studied a specific paradigm where differential privacy and SFE
co-exist: the function to compute is decided from differentially private analyses and the method to compute
it is decided from SFE theory. Specific functions such as SUM were studied in this setting, but no exact
optimality results are available. Exact optimality of non-interactive communication is demonstrated for two-
party AND and XOR function computations in [21]. A curious fact in the context of AND computation is that
[21] requires the randomization of the bit to be in an output space of three letters (as opposed to the binary
alphabet in standard randomized response). At a first glance, this appears to be in contradiction to the claim
in this paper. A closer look reveals that randomized response also achieves the same performance (worst-case
accuracy over the four inputs) when combined with a different (and randomized) decision function. Indeed,
the techniques from [34] allow one to foresee this from an abstract point of view: every differentially private
mechanism of a bit can be simulated from the output of randomized response with the same level of privacy.
In other words, if b is the bit, and X is the (random) output of randomized response and Y is the (random)
output of some differentially private mechanism operating on b, then there exists a joint distribution on
(X,Y ) such that the Markov chain b−X − Y holds. This is discussed in detail in a later discussion section.
Function approximation has been widely studied in differential privacy literature under a centralized
model where there is a single trusted entity owning a statistical database over a large number of individuals.
Under this centralized setting, statistical learning has also been widely studied in differential privacy, e.g.
classification [27, 9], k-means clustering [4], principal component analysis [7, 8, 23, 26]. In particular, it has
been shown in [27] that under the centralized setting there exists a class of concepts that is efficiently learnable
by interactive algorithms whereas a non-interactive algorithm requires exponential number of samples. An
algorithm is called interactive in the centralized model, if it involves multiple rounds of communications
between the server and the client. In contrast, we consider a multi-party setting where privacy barrier is
on each individual owning his/her own data. All communication happens in multiple rounds in multi-party
computation, and a protocol is called interactive in the multi-party setting if one party’s message depends
on other party’s previous messages. In this sense, the notion of interaction in multi-party computation is
significantly different from what has been previously studied under centralized client-server settings.
2 Problem formulation
Consider the setting where we have k parties, each with its own private binary data xi ∈ {0, 1} generated
independently. The independence assumption here is necessary because without it each party can learn some-
thing about others, which violates differential privacy, even without revealing any information. We discuss
possible extensions to correlated sources in Section 4. Differential privacy implicitly imposes independence
in a multi-party setting. The goal of the private multi-party computation is for each party i ∈ [k] to compute
an arbitrary function fi : {0, 1}k → Y of interest by interactively broadcasting messages, while preserving the
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privacy of each party. There might be a central observer who listens to all the messages being broadcasted,
and wants to compute another arbitrary function f0 : {0, 1} → Y. The k parties are honest in the sense that
once they agree on what protocol to follow, every party follows the rules. At the same time, they can be
curious, and each party needs to ensure other parties cannot learn his bit with sufficient confidence. This
privacy constraints are local differential privacy setting studied in [12] in the sense that there are multiple
privacy barriers, each one separating each individual party and the rest of the world. However, the main
difference is that we consider multi-party computation, where there are multiple functions to be computed,
and each node might possess a different function to be computed.
Let x = [x1, . . . , xk] ∈ {0, 1}k denote the vector of k bits, and x−i = [x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xk] ∈
{0, 1}k−1 is the vector of bits except for the i-th bit. The parties agree on an interactive protocol to achieve
the goal of multi-party computation. A ‘transcript’ is the output of the protocol, and is a random instance
of all broadcasted messages until all the communication terminates. The probability that a transcript τ is
broadcasted (via a series of interactive communications) when the data is x is denoted by Px,τ = P(τ |x)
for x ∈ {0, 1}k and for τ ∈ T . Then, a protocol can be represented as a matrix denoting the probability
distribution over a set of transcripts T conditioned on x: P = [Px,τ ] ∈ [0, 1]2k×|T |.
In the end, each party makes a decision on what the value of function fi is, based on its own bit xi and
the transcript τ that was broadcasted. A decision rule is a mapping from a transcript τ ∈ T and private bit
xi ∈ {0, 1} to a decision y ∈ Y represented by a function fˆi(τ, xi). We allow randomized decision rules, in
which case fˆi(τ, xi) can be a random variable. For the central observer, a decision rule is a function of just
the transcript, denoted by a function fˆ0(τ).
We consider two notions of accuracy: the average accuracy and the worst-case accuracy. For the i-th
party, consider an accuracy measure wi : Y × Y → R (or equivalently a negative cost function) such that
wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi)) measures the accuracy when the function to be computed is fi(x) and the approximation
is fˆi(τ, xi). Then the average accuracy for this i-th party is defined as
ACCave(P,wi, fi, fˆi) ≡ 1
2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
Efˆi,Px,τ [wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi))] , (1)
where the expectation is taken over the random transcript τ distribution as P and also any randomness in
the decision function fˆi. For example, if the accuracy measure is an indicator such that wi(y, y
′) = I(y=y′),
then ACCave measures the average probability of getting the correct function output. For a given protocol
P , it takes (2k |T |) operations to compute the optimal decision rule:
f∗i,ave(τ, xi) = arg max
y∈Y
∑
x−i∈{0,1}k−1
Px,τ wi(fi(x), y) , (2)
for each i ∈ [k]. The computational cost of (2k |T |) for computing the optimal decision rule is unavoidable
in general, since that is the inherent complexity of the problem: describing the distribution of the transcript
requires the same cost. We will show that the optimal protocol requires a set of transcripts of size |T | = 2k,
and the computational complexity of the decision rule for general a function is 22k. However, for a fixed
protocol, this decision rule needs to be computed only once before any message is transmitted. Further,
it is also possible to find a closed form solution for the decision rule when f has a simple structure. One
example is the XOR function studied in detail in Section 3.3, where the optimal decision rule is as simple
as evaluating the XOR of all the received bits, which requires O(k) operations. When there are multiple
maximizers y, we can choose arbitrarily, and it follows that there is no gain in randomizing the decision rule
for average accuracy. Similarly, the worst-case accuracy is defined as
ACCwc(P,wi, fi, fˆi) ≡ min
x∈{0,1}k
Efˆi,Px,τ [wi(fi(x), fˆi(τ, xi))] . (3)
For worst-case accuracy, given a protocol P , the optimal decision rule of the i-th party with a bit xi can be
computed by solving the following convex program:
Q(xi) = arg max
Q∈R|T |×|Y|
min
x−i∈{0,1}k−1
∑
τ∈T
∑
y∈Y
Px,τ wi(fi(x), y)Qτ,y (4)
subject to
∑
y∈Y
Qτ,y = 1 , ∀τ ∈ T and Q ≥ 0
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The optimal (random) decision rule f∗i,wc(τ, xi) is to output y given transcript τ according to P(y|τ, xi) =
Q
(xi)
τ,y . This can be formulated as a linear program with (|T | |Y|) variables and (2k + |T |) constraints. Again,
it is possible to find a closed form solution for the decision rule when f has a simple structure: for the
XOR function, the optimal decision rule is again evaluating the XOR of all the received bits requiring O(k)
operations. For a central observer, the accuracy measures are defined similarly, and the optimal decision
rule is now
f∗0,ave(τ) = arg max
y∈Y
∑
x∈{0,1}k
Px,τ w0(f0(x), y) , (5)
and for worst-case accuracy the optimal (random) decision rule f∗0,wc(τ) is to output y given transcript τ
according to P(y|τ) = Q(0)τ,y.
Q(0) = arg max
Q∈R|T |×|Y|
min
x∈{0,1}k
∑
τ∈T
∑
y∈Y
Px,τ w0(f0(x), y)Qτ,y (6)
subject to
∑
y∈Y
Qτ,y = 1 , ∀τ ∈ T and Q ≥ 0
where w0 : Y × Y → R is the measure of accuracy for the central observer.
Privacy is measured by differential privacy [13, 14]. Since we allow heterogeneous privacy constraints, we
use εi to denote the desired privacy level of the i-th party. We say a protocol P is εi-differentially private
for the i-th party if for i ∈ [k], and all xi, x′i ∈ {0, 1}, x−i ∈ {0, 1}k−1, and τ ∈ T ,
P(τ |xi, x−i) ≤ eεi P(τ |x′i, x−i) . (7)
This condition ensures no adversary can infer the private data xi with high enough confidence, no matter what
auxiliary information he might have and independent of his computational power. To lighten notations, we
let λi = e
εi and say a protocol is λi-differentially private for the i-th party. If the protocol is λi-differentially
private for all i ∈ [k], then we say that the protocol is {λi}-differentially private for all parties.
A necessary condition on the multi-party protocols P , when the bits are generated independent of each
other, is protocol compatibility [21]: conditioned on the transcript of the protocol, the input bits stay
independent of each other. Mathematically, a protocol P is protocol compatible if each column P (τ) is a
rank-one tensor, when reshaped into a k-th order tensor P (τ) ∈ [0, 1]2×2×...×2, where
P (τ)x1,...,xk = Px,τ . (8)
Precisely, there exist vectors u(1) . . . , u(k) such that P (τ) = u(1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ u(k), where ⊗ denotes the standard
outer-product, i.e. P
(τ)
i1,...,ik
= u
(1)
i1
× · · · × u(k)ik . This is crucial in deriving the main results, and it is a
well-known fact in the secure multi-party computation literature. This follows from the fact that when
the bits are generated independently, all the bits are still independent conditioned on the transcript, i.e.
P (x|τ) = ∏i P (xi|τ), which follows implicitly from [29] and directly from Equation (6) of [35]. For example,
for a two-party case where P (x|τ) = P (x1|τ)P (x2|τ),
P =
[
P (τ |00) P (τ |01)
P (τ |10) P (τ |11)
]
= 4P (τ)
[
P (00|τ) P (01|τ)
P (10|τ) P (11|τ)
]
= 4P (τ)
[
P (x1 = 0|τ)
P (x1 = 1|τ)
] [
P (x2 = 0|τ) P (x2 = 1|τ)
]
Notice that using the rank-one tensor representation of each column of the protocol P (τ), we have P (τ |xi =
0, x−i)/P (τ |xi = 1, x−i) = u(i)1 /u(i)2 . It follows that P is λi-differentially private if and only if λ−1i u(i)2 ≤
u
(i)
1 ≤ λiu(i)2 .
Randomized response. Consider the following simple protocol known as the randomized response, which
is a term first coined by Warner [38] and commonly used in many private communications including the
multi-party setting [31]. We will show in Section 3 that this is the optimal protocol for simultaneously
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maximizing the accuracy of all the parties. Each party broadcasts a randomized version of its bit denoted
by x˜i such that
x˜i =
{
xi with probability
λi
1+λi
,
x¯i with probability
1
1+λi
,
(9)
where x¯i is the logical complement of xi. Each transcript can be represented by the output of the protocol,
which in this case is x˜ = [x˜1, . . . , x˜k] ∈ T , where T = {0, 1}k is now the set of all broadcasted bits. For
example, in a simple case where k = 2 and λ1 = λ2 = λ, we have
P =
1
(1 + λ)2

λ2 λ λ 1
λ λ2 1 λ
λ 1 λ2 λ
1 λ λ λ2
 ,
and the first column can be represented as a rank-one 2nd order tensor (which is a matrix) as
P (00) =
[
P(x˜ = 00|x = 00) P(x˜ = 00|x = 01)
P(x˜ = 00|x = 10) P(x˜ = 00|x = 11)
]
=
1
(1 + λ)2
[
λ2 λ
λ 1
]
=
1
(1 + λ)2
[
λ
1
] [
λ 1
]
.
This confirms that the first column of P is a rank-one matrix P (00) with u(1) = (1/(1 + λ))[λ , 1] and
u(2) = (1/(1 + λ))[λ , 1], hence protocol compatible. Also notice that it satisfies the differential privacy
constraints, since λ−1u(i)2 ≤ u(i)1 ≤ λu(i)2 .
Accuracy maximization. Consider the problem of maximizing the average accuracy for a centralized
observer with function f . Up to the scaling of 1/2k in (1), the accuracy can be written as∑
x∈{0,1}k
EP [w(f(x), fˆ0(τ))] =
∑
x
∑
y∈Y
w(f0(x), y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,W (y)x
∑
τ∈T
Px,τ P(fˆ0(τ) = y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Qτ,y
, (10)
where fˆ0(τ) denotes the randomized decision up on receiving the transcript τ . In the following we define
W
(y)
x , w(f0(x), y) to represent the accuracy measure and Qτ,y , P(fˆ(τ) = y) to represent the decision rule.
Focusing on this single central observer for the purpose of illustration, we want to design protocols Px,τ
and decision rules Qτ,y that maximize the above accuracy. Further, this protocol has to be compatible with
interactive communication, satisfying the rank one condition discussed above, and satisfy the differential
privacy condition in (7). Hence, we can formulate the accuracy maximization can be formulated as follows
given W
(y)
x ’s in terms of the function f0(·) to be computed and an accuracy measure w0(·, ·), and required
privacy level λi’s:
maximize
P∈R2k×|T |,Q∈R|T |×|Y|
∑
x,∈{0,1}k,y∈Y
W (y)x
∑
τ∈T
Px,τQτ,y
subject to P and Q are row-stochastic matrices ,
rank(P (τ)) = 1 , ∀τ ∈ T ,
P(xi,x−i),τ ≤ λiP(x′i,x−i),τ , ∀i ∈ [k], x1, x′1,∈ {0, 1}, x−i ∈ {0, 1}k−1 and τ ∈ T ,
(11)
where P (τ) is defined as a k-th order tensor defined from the τ -th column of matrix P as defined in Equation
(8). Notice that the rank constraint is only a necessary condition for a protocol to be compatible with
interactive communication schemes, i.e. a valid interactive communication protocol implies the rank-one
condition but not all rank-one protocols are valid interactive communication schemes. Therefore, the above
is a relaxation with larger feasible set of protocols, but in turns out that the optimal solution of the above
optimization problem is the randomized response, which is a valid (non-interactive) communication protocol.
Hence, there is no loss in solving the above relaxation.
The main challenge in solving this optimization is that it is a rank-constrained tensor optimization
which is notoriously difficult. Since the rank constraint is over a k-th order tensor (k-dimensional array)
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with possibly k > 2, common approaches of convex relaxation from [36] for matrices (which are 2nd order
tensors) does not apply. Further, we want to simultaneously apply similar optimizations to all the parties
with different functions to be computed.
We introduce a novel transformation of the above rank-constrained optimization into a linear program
in (16) and (19). The price we pay is in the increased dimensionality: the LP has an infinite dimensional
decision variable. However, combined with the geometric understanding of the the manifold of rank-1 tensors,
we can identify the exact optimal solution. We show in the next section that given desired level of privacy
{λi}i∈[k], there is a single universal protocol that simultaneously maximizes the accuracy for (a) all parties;
(b) any functions of interest; (c) any accuracy measures; and (d) both worst-case and average case accuracy.
Together with optimal decision rules performed at each of the receiving ends, this gives the exact optimal
multi-party computation scheme.
3 Main Result
We show, perhaps surprisingly, that the simple randomized response presented in (9) is the unique optimal
protocol in a very general sense. For any desired privacy level λi, and arbitrary function fi, for any accuracy
measure wi, and any notion of accuracy (either average or worst case), we show that the randomized response
is universally optimal.
Theorem 3.1 Let the optimal decision rule be defined as in (2) for the average accuracy and (4) for the
worst-case accuracy. Then, for any λi ≥ 1, any function fi : {0, 1}k → Y, and any accuracy measure
wi : Y ×Y → R for i ∈ [k], the randomized response for given λi with the optimal decision function achieves
the maximum accuracy for the i-th party among all {λi}-differentially private interactive protocols and all
decision rules. For the central observer, the randomized response with the optimal decision rule defined as in
(5) and (6) achieves the maximum accuracy among all {λi}-differentially private interactive protocols and
all decision rules for any arbitrary function f0 and any measure of accuracy w0.
This is a strong universal optimality. Every party and the central observer can simultaneously achieve
the optimal accuracy, using a universal randomized response. Each party only needs to know its own desired
level of privacy, its own function to be computed, and its measure of accuracy. Optimal data release and
optimal decision making is naturally separated. However, it is not immediate at all that a non-interactive
scheme such as the randomized response would achieve the maximum accuracy. We need to utilize the
convex geometry of the problem, in order to show that interaction is not necessary.
Once we know that interaction does not help, we can make an educated guess that the randomized
response should dominate over other non-interactive schemes. This intuition follows from the dominance of
randomized response in the single-party setting, that was proved using a powerful operational interpretation
of differential privacy first introduced in [34]. This intuition can in fact be made rigorous, as we show in the
following section with a simple two-party example.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first focus on the scenario where a central observer wants to compute a function f over k bits distributed
across k parties. We will show in Section 3.1.1 that ACCave(P,w, f, fˆ) is maximized when randomized
response protocol is used with the optimal decision rule of (5). Subsequently in Section 3.1.2, we show that
ACCwc(P,w, f, fˆ) is maximized when again randomized response protocol is used with the optimal decision
rule of (6). Theorem 3.1 directly follows from these two results, since the i-th party can compute the optimal
decision and achieve the maximum accuracy for each instance of xi ∈ {0, 1}.
3.1.1 Proof for the average case
Theorem 3.2 For a central observer who wants to compute f with accuracy measure w, randomized response
with the optimal decision rule of (5) maximizes the average accuracy ACCave(P,w, f, fˆ) among all {λi}-
differentially private protocols and all decision rules.
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In this section, we provide a proof of this theorem. We want to solve the rank-constrained optimization
problem of (11). The sketch of the proof is as follows. First, we introduce a novel change of variables to
transform the optimization into an infinite dimensional linear program. Next, we show that if the optimal
solution to this LP has non-zero probability only for ‘extremal’ transcripts (see Definition 3.3), then there
is only one possible protocol which is the randomized response in (9). Finally, we finish the proof by using
dual LP to prove that the optimal solution can only have non-zero probability at the ‘extremal’ transcripts.
LP formulation. We want to maximize the average accuracy over P and Q, where the average accuracy is
(up to a scaling by 1/2k)∑
x
EP [w(f(x), fˆ(τ))] =
∑
x
∑
y∈Y
w(f(x), y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,W (y)x
∑
τ∈T
Px,τ P(fˆ(τ) = y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
,Qτ,y
=
∑
y
〈
W (y),
∑
τ
PτQτ,y
〉
,
where 〈, 〉 denote the standard inner product such that
〈
W (y), PτQτ,y
〉
=
∑
x
(
W
(y)
x Px,τQτ,y
)
, and Pτ is the
column of the matrix P corresponding to τ . The 2k × |T |-dimensional matrix P represents the conditional
distribution of the transcripts τ given the original data x, such that Px,τ = P(τ |x). The |T |×|Y|-dimensional
matrix Q represents the decision rule, possibly randomized. For example, if we consider two-party XOR
computation with the same level of privacy λ, a solution (which turns out to be optimal) is randomized
response with decision rule according to the XOR of the received bits. In particular, τ ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11} and
y = fˆ(τ) is the XOR of the two bits in τ . This can be written as
P =
1
(1 + λ)2

λ2 λ λ 1
λ λ2 1 λ
λ 1 λ2 λ
1 λ λ λ2
 , and Q =

1 0
0 1
0 1
1 0
 . (12)
Notice that the labeling of τ is arbitrary and applying the same permutation to the columns of P and the
rows of Q does not change the feasibility or the accuracy of the solution. The columns of P are still rank one
when written in an appropriate tensor form, and also satisfy the differential privacy constraints. Another
important point is that we cannot restrict the number of transcripts a priori, and when solving (11), we need
to consider infinite dimensional (but countable) T = Z. The objective and the constraints depend on
[P(y, fˆ(τ) = y|x)]x,τ,y = [Px,τQτ,y]x,τ,y ,
for x ∈ {0, 1}k, τ ∈ Z, and y ∈ Y where how we label or index the transcript τ is arbitrary. Since the rank
constraints on the tensorized version of the columns of P are difficult to handle, we exploit the fact that the
problem is invariant in renaming of the transcript index τ , and introduce a new indexing of the transcripts
and new representation of the effective decision variable [P(y, fˆ(τ) = y|x)]x,τ,y.
Define a signature vector as a vector S(s1,...,sk) ∈ R2
k
indexed by (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ [λ−11 , λ1]× · · · × [λ−1k , λk].
A signature vector Ss1,...,sk is a vectorized version of a rank-one tensor [1 , s1]⊗ · · · ⊗ [1 , sk] (to ensure that
the rank constraint is satisfied) with λ−1i ≤ si ≤ λi for all i ∈ [k] (to ensure that the differential privacy
constraint is satisfied). The index (s1, . . . , sk) effectively replaces the indexing of the transcript τ . Consider
an infinite dimensional matrix S, where the number of rows is 2k and the number of columns is uncountably
infinite. The signature matrix S contains as its columns all possible choices of the signature vector S(s1,...,sk)
indexed by (s1, . . . , sk). Given this definition S, the space of all possible feasible protocols and all possible
corresponding decision rules can be represented as
[P(y, fˆ(τ) = y|x)]x,τ,y = [Sx,(s1,...,sk)θ(y)(s1,...,sk)]x,(s1,...,sk),y , (13)
where the equality is up to a appropriate mapping of indexes in τ and (s1, . . . , sk) and merging/splitting/dropping
of appropriate columns. As a concrete example, the conditional distribution of outputting y = 0 in (12) is
[P(τ, fˆ(τ) = y|x)]x,τ,y=0 = P diag(Q(0)) = 1
(1 + λ)2

λ2 0 0 1
λ 0 0 λ
λ 0 0 λ
1 0 0 λ2
 , (14)
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which can be represented (up to a reindexing of the columns) using the signature matrix as
S diag(θ(0)) =

1 · · · 1 · · ·
λ−1 · · · λ · · ·
λ−1 · · · λ · · ·
λ−2 · · · λ2 · · ·


λ2
(1+λ)2
0
. . .
0
1
(1+λ)2
0
. . .

(15)
For all practical purposes, these two matrices represent the same protocol and the same decision rule. Since
S is a fixed matrix for given problem parameters k and λi’s, the new decision variable is just the set of scaling
vectors {θ(y)}y∈Y . By optimizing over θ(y)’s, we are effectively selecting a subset of signatures to include in
our transcript, and choosing the randomized outputs of those selected transcripts. We want to maximize
the average accuracy, conditioned on the fact that conditional probabilities sum to one and probabilities are
non-negative.
maximize
θ(1),...,θ(|Y|)
∑
y∈Y
〈W (y), Sθ(y)〉 =
∑
y∈Y,(s1,...,sk)
(STW (y))(s1,...,sk)θ
(y)
(s1,...,sk)
subject to
∑
y∈Y
∑
(s1,...,sk)
S(s1,...,sk)θ
(y)
(s1,...,sk)
= 1
θ(y) ≥ 0.
(16)
This is a linear program in θ(y)’s and once we have the optimal solution we can translate it to the original
variables using (13). However, numerically solving the above problem is infeasible since the dimension of
each variable θ(y) is now uncountably infinite. We first claim that the solution of this problem is simple and
can be represented in a closed form, and then prove this claim using the dual LP.
Definition 3.3 A 2k-dimensional column vector S(s1,...,sk) is extremal if the k-th order tensorization of
S(s1,...,sk) is a rank-one tensor of the form [1 , s1]⊗ · · · ⊗ [1 , sk] with factors si ∈ {λ−1i , λi} for all i ∈ [k].
There are 2k such extremal columns of S.
This notion of extremal transcript is consistent with a similar notion of extremal privatization mechanisms
defined in [25] as a set of mechanisms whose conditional distributions are at the extreme points of differential
privacy constraints. When k = 2 there are four extremal columns of S:
1
λ1
λ2
λ1λ2
 ,

1
λ1
λ−12
λ1λ
−1
2
 ,

1
λ−11
λ2
λ−11 λ2
 ,

1
λ−11
λ−12
λ−11 λ
−1
2
 .
We make the following claim.
Remark 3.4 The optimal solution to the LP in (16) only has strictly positive θ
(y)
(s1,...,sk)
for (s1, . . . , sk)
corresponding to extremal columns of S and all the non-extremal columns are set to zero.
Suppose for now that this claim is true, then we can make following observations.
• There is an optimal solution of the LP that requires no randomized decision. Suppose the set {θ(y)}y∈Y
is an optimal solution, and there is an extremal transcript (s1, . . . , sk) such that both θ
(y1)
(s1,...,sk)
and
θ
(y2)
(s1,...,sk)
are non-zero for some y1, y2 ∈ Y. Then, we can construct a new optimal solution by setting
θ˜
(y1)
(s1,...,sk)
= θ
(y1)
(s1,...,sk)
+ θ
(y2)
(s1,...,sk)
and θ˜
(y2)
(s1,...,sk)
= 0. Continuing in this fashion, we can construct an
optimal solution with no randomization.
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• Since the 2k × 2k sub matrix of S corresponding to the extremal columns is now an invertible matrix,
θ =
∑
y∈Y θ
(y) is easily computed by the equality constraint. Once the optimal θ is fixed, we can
identify the optimal decision rule for each transcript separately. Among θ
(y)
(s1,...,sk)
’s for y ∈ Y, put
all the mass on the y that maximizes (STW (y))(s1,...,sk). The optimal protocol S diag(θ) is uniquely
determined, and finding the optimal decision rule (i.e. θ(y)) is also simple once we have the protocol.
This gives the precise optimal decision rule described in Equation (2).
• This uniquely determined optimal protocol is the randomized response defined in Equation (9) for all
possible choices of the problem parameters, and it is a non-interactive protocol.
Proof of the remark 3.4 using the geometry of the manifold of rank one tensors. Now, we are left
to prove the claim that the optimal solution only contains the extremal signatures. Consider a k-dimensional
manifold in 2k-dimensional space:
M{λi} = {T : T = [1, t1]⊗ · · · ⊗ [1, tk] and λ−1i ≤ ti ≤ λi for all i ∈ [k]} ,
P{λi} = conv(M{λi}) ,
where conv(·) is the convex hull of a set. The following result characterizes the polytope P{λi}, the proof of
which is moved to Section A.2.
Lemma 3.5 The convex hull P{λi} is a polytope with 2k faces and 2k corner points corresponding to the
2k extremal columns of S. Further, the intersection of the manifold M{λi} and the boundary of P{λi} is
only the set of those corner points. Hence, any point in the manifold is represented as a convex combination
of the corner points, and it requires all the corner points to represent any point in the manifold that is not
already one of the corner points.
This implies that any column of S can be represented as a convex combination of the extremal columns of
S. We can write the dual of the primal LP in Equation (16) as:
minimize
µ∈R2k
∑
x∈{0,1}k
µx
subject to 〈S(s1,...,sk), µ〉 ≥ 〈S(s1,...,sk) , W (y)〉 , for all y ∈ Y, (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ [λ−11 , λ1]× · · · × [λ−1k , λk].
(17)
Consider an optimal dual solution µ∗. We now prove that for any dual optimal solution, the constraints in
Equation (17) can be met with equality only for the indices (s1, . . . , sk) corresponding to corner points of
P{λi}. By complementary slackness of LP, this implies that the primal variable θ(y)(s1,...,sk) can only be strictly
positive for the extremal transcripts, and all non-extremal transcripts must be zero.
If 〈T, µ∗〉 = ∑xW (y)x Tx for some T ∈M{λi} which is not an extremal point, then it follows from Lemma
3.5 that T can be represented as a convex combination of the extremal points. Unless all the constraints for
µ∗ are satisfied with equalities (which can only happen if W (y) are all same for all y ∈ Y and all protocols and
decision rules achieve the same accuracy), there exists at least one extremal signature S(s1,...,sk) such that
the inequality in (17) is violated. Hence, it contradicts the assumption that µ∗ is a feasible dual solution.
3.1.2 Proof for the worst-case accuracy
Theorem 3.6 For a central observer who wants to compute f with accuracy measure w, randomized response
with the optimal decision rule of (6) maximizes the worst-case accuracy ACCwc(P,w, f, fˆ) among all {λi}-
differentially private protocols and all decision rules.
In this section, we provide a proof of this theorem. Consider the worst case accuracy of the form
min
x∈{0,1}k
Efˆ(τ)[w(f(x), fˆ(τ))] = minx
∑
y∈Y
w(f(x), y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
W
(y)
x
∑
τ∈T
Px,τ P(fˆ(τ) = y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qτ,y
.
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Using the signature matrix S, we can write this as maximizing a concave function (minimum over a set of
linear functions is a concave function):
maximize
θ(1),...,θ(|Y|)
min
x∈{0,1}k
{∑
y∈Y
W (y)x
(
Sθ(y)
)
x
}
subject to S
∑
y∈Y
θ(y) = 1
θ(y) ≥ 0.
(18)
This can be formulated as the following primal LP:
maximize
ξ,θ(1),...,θ(|Y|)
ξ
subject to ξ ≤
{∑
y∈Y
W (y)x
(
Sθ(y)
)
x
}
, for all x ∈ {0, 1}k
S
∑
y∈Y
θ(y) = 1
θ(y) ≥ 0.
(19)
Define dual variables ν ∈ R2k corresponding to the first set of constraints and µ ∈ R2k to the second. Then
the dual LP is
minimize
ν,µ
∑
x
µx
subject to 〈S(s1,...,sk), µ〉 ≥
∑
x
W (y)x Sx,(s1,...,sk)νx , for all y ∈ Y, (s1, . . . , sk) ∈ [λ−11 , λ1]× · · · × [λ−1k , λk]
1T ν = 1
ν ≥ 0.
(20)
Consider an optimal solution (ν∗, µ∗). This defines a polytope for the each column of S put in a tensor
form in R2k :
Pν∗,µ∗ = {T : 〈T, µ∗〉 ≥
∑
x
W (y)x Txν
∗
x, for all y ∈ Y}.
Now, (ν∗, µ∗) is feasible if and only if P{λi} ⊆ Pν∗,µ∗ , since the condition must be met by all λ-DP protocol-
compatible transcripts.
Since both Pν∗,µ∗ and P{λi} are convex polytopes, and P{λi} ⊆ Pν∗,µ∗ for our choice of optimal solutions,
then the constraints in Eq. (20) can only be met with equality for signatures corresponding to the intersection
ofM{λi} and the boundary of Pν∗,µ∗ . From Lemma 3.5, we know that such intersection can only happen at
the extremal points. By complementary slackness of LP, this implies that the primal variable θ
(y)
(s1,...,sk)
can
only be strictly positive for the extremal transcripts, and all non-extremal transcripts must have zero value.
However, in this case, one might need to resort to randomized decisions depending on the accuracy weights
W .
The optimality of the extremal protocols can also be also explained perhaps more intuitively as fol-
lows. Consider the primal LP formulation. Let Θ = {θ(1), . . . , θ(|Y|)} be an optimal solution that has
at least one value that is non-extremal. Without loss of generality, let θ
(1)
i be the positive value corre-
sponding to a non-extremal transcript Si. Then, by the lemma, we know that we can represent Si =∑2k
j=1 αjSj , where S1 . . . , S2k are the extremal transcripts. Then, we can construct another feasible solution
Θ˜ = {θ˜(1), . . . , θ˜(|Y|)} from Θ, by taking the value of θ(1)i and add it to the extremal ones according to
θ˜
(1)
j = θ
(1)
j + αjθ
(1)
i , and setting θ˜
(1)
i = 0. The new solution preserves the summation Sθ˜
(y) = Sθ(y). Since
the new solution has one less non-extremal value, we can continue in this fashion until we are left with only
extremal transcripts.
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3.2 Two-party function computation
In this section, we show that randomized response always dominates over any other non-interactive schemes.
Precisely, we will show the following claim: for any non-interactive protocol and a decision rule, there exists
a randomized response and a decision rule for the randomized response that achieves the same accuracy, for
any privacy level, any function, and any measure of accuracy.
The statement is generally true, but for concreteness we focus on a specific example in the two-party
setting, which captures all the main ideas. In this setting, there are essentially only two functions of interest,
AND and XOR, and it is only interesting to consider the scenario where the central observer is trying to
compute these functions over two bits distributed across two parties. Private AND function computation
under the worst-case accuracy measure was studied in [21]. The authors of [21] proposed a non-interactive
scheme and showed that it achieves the optimal accuracy of λ(λ2 +λ+ 2)/(1 +λ)3 when both parties satisfy
λ-differential privacy.
We will show by example how to construct a randomized response that dominates any non-interactive
scheme. The protocol proposed in [21] outputs a privatized version of each bit according to the following
rule
M(0) =

0 w.p. λ1+λ
1 w.p. λ(1+λ)2
2 w.p. 1(1+λ)2
, and M(1) =

0 w.p. 11+λ
1 w.p. λ
2
(1+λ)2
2 w.p. λ(1+λ)2
,
which satisfies λ-differential privacy. Such a non-interactive protocol of revealing the privatized data is
referred to as a privacy mechanism. Upon receiving this data, the central observer makes a decision according
to
fˆ(M(x1),M(x2)) =
{
1 if M(x1) = 2 or M(x2) = 2
M(x1) ∧M(x2) otherwise .
Now consider the randomized response mechanisms:
MRR(xi) =
{
xi with probability
λ
1+λ ,
x¯i with probability
1
1+λ .
The dominance of this randomized response follows from a more general result proved in [34] which
introduces a new operational interpretation of differential privacy mechanisms that provides strong analytical
tools to compare privacy mechanisms.
This crucially relies on the following representation of the privacy guarantees of a mechanism. Given a
mechanism, consider a binary hypothesis test on whether the original bit was a zero or a one based on the
output of the mechanism. Then, the two types of errors (false alarm and missed detection) on this binary
hypothesis testing problem defines a two-dimensional region where one axis is PFA and the other is PMD.
For a rejection set S for rejecting the null hypothesis, PFA = P(M(x) ∈ S) and PMD = P(M(x) /∈ S). The
convex hull of the set of all pairs (PMD, PFA) for all rejection sets, define the hypothesis testing region. For
example, the mechanism M corresponds to region RM and the randomized response corresponds to region
RMRR in Figure 1, which happens to be identical.
Differential privacy conditions can be interpreted as imposing a condition on this region:
PFA + λPMD ≥ 1 , and λPFA + PMD ≥ 1 ,
which defines a triangular region denoted by Rλ and shown in Figure 1.
Theorem 3.7 ([34, Theorem 2.3]) A mechanism is λ-differentially private if and only if the correspond-
ing hypothesis testing region is included inside Rλ.
This is a special case of the original theorem which proves a more general theorem for (ε, δ)-differential
privacy. We can immediately check that both M and MRR are λ-differentially private.
It is no coincidence that the regions RM , RMRR , and Rλ are identical. It follows from the next theorem
on the operational interpretation of differential privacy. We say a mechanism M1 dominates a mechanism
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Figure 1: Three regions RM , RMRR , and Rλ are identical (ε = 1.5).
M2 if M2(x) is conditionally independent of x conditioned on M1(x). In other words, we can construct
the following Markov chain: x −M1(x) −M2(x). This is again equivalent to saying that there is another
mechanism T such that M2(x) = T (M1(x)). Such an operational interpretation of differential privacy brings
both the natural data processing inequality and the strong converse to the data processing inequality, which
follows from a celebrated result of Blackwell on comparing two stochastic experiments [3]. These inequalities,
while simple by themselves, lead to surprisingly strong technical results, and there is a long line of such a
tradition in the information theory literature: Chapter 17 of [11] enumerates a detailed list.
Theorem 3.8 (Data processing inequality for differential privacy [34, Theorem 2.4]) If a mech-
anism M1 dominates another mechanism M2, then
RM2 ⊆ RM1 .
Theorem 3.9 (A strong converse to the data processing inequality [34, Theorem 2.5]) For two mech-
anisms M1 and M2, there exists a coupling of the two mechanisms such that M1 dominates M2, if
RM2 ⊆ RM1 .
Among other things, this implies that among all λ-differentially private mechanisms, the randomized response
dominates all of them. It follows that, for an arbitrary mechanism M , there is another mechanism T such
that M(x) = T (MRR(x)).
In the two-party setting, this implies the desired claim that there is no point in doing anything other
than the randomized response, and that for the AND example, even though the protocol in [21] uses an
alphabet of three letters for each party, it is still able to achieve maximum accuracy, because there is no
reduction in the hypothesis testing region. The final decision is made as per fˆ(M(x1),M(x2)). Without
doing any calculations, one could have guessed that this is achievable with randomized response which uses
only the minimal two letters by simply simulating M(xi) upon receiving MRR(xi), namely, by computing
fˆRR(MRR(x1),MRR(x2)) = fˆ(T (M(x1)), T (M(x2))). The new decision rule for randomized response is:
fˆRR(MRR(x1),MRR(x2)) =

0 if (MRR(x1),MRR(x2)) = (0, 0)
1 if (MRR(x1),MRR(x2)) = (1, 1)
0 if (MRR(x1),MRR(x2)) = (0, 1) or (1, 0), then with probability
λ
1+λ
1 if (MRR(x1),MRR(x2)) = (0, 1) or (1, 0), then with probability
1
1+λ
.
3.3 Multi-party XOR computation
For a given function and a given accuracy measure, analyzing the performance of the optimal protocol
provides the exact nature of the privacy-accuracy tradeoff. Consider a scenario where a central observer
wants to compute the XOR of all the k-bits, each of which is λ-differentially private. In this special case,
we can apply our main theorem to analyze the accuracy exactly in a combinatorial form, and we provide a
proof in Section A.1.
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Corollary 3.10 Consider k-party computation for f0(x) = x1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ xk, and the accuracy measure is one
if correct and zero if not, i.e. w0(0, 0) = w0(1, 1) = 1 and w0(0, 1) = w0(1, 0) = 0. For any {λ}-differentially
private protocol P and any decision rule fˆ , the average and worst-case accuracies are bounded by
ACCave(P,w0, f0, fˆ0) ≤
∑bk/2c
i=0
(
k
2i
)
λk−2i
(1 + λ)k
, and ACCwc(P,w0, f0fˆ0) ≤
∑bk/2c
i=0
(
k
2i
)
λk−2i
(1 + λ)k
,
and the equality is achieved by the randomized response and optimal decision rules in (5) and (6).
The optimal decision for both accuracies is simply to output the XOR of the received privatized bits. This
is a strict generalization of a similar result in [21], where XOR computation was studied but only for a
two-party setting. In the high privacy regime, where ε ' 0 (equivalently λ = eε ' 1), this implies that
ACCave = 0.5 + 2
−(k+1)εk +O(εk+1) .
The leading term is due to the fact that we are considering an accuracy measure of a Boolean function. The
second term of 2−(k+1)εk captures the effect that, we are essentially observing the XOR through k consecutive
binary symmetric channels with flipping probability λ/(1 + λ). Hence, the accuracy gets exponentially
worse in k. On the other hand, if those k-parties are allowed to collaborate, then they can compute the
XOR in advance and only transmit the privatized version of the XOR, achieving accuracy of λ/(1 + λ) =
0.5 + (1/4)ε2 +O(ε3). This is always better than not collaborating, which is the bound in Corollary 3.10.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss a few topics, each of which are interesting but non-trivial to solve in any obvious
way. Our main result is general and sharp, but we want to ask how we can push it even further.
Generalization to multiple bits. When each party owns multiple bits, it is possible that interactive
protocols improve over the randomized response protocol. For example, consider the first party with one bit
x and the second party has two bits y1 and y2. Each bit needs to be protected as per ε-differential privacy.
A central observer wishes to compute the following function:
f(x, y1, y2) =
{
y1 ⊕ y2 if x = 0 ,
y1 ∧ y2 if x = 1 .
Randomized response would publish privatized versions of x, y1, and y2 according to (9). In an interactive
scheme, looking at x˜, the second party publishes (the privatized version of) either y1⊕y2 (if x˜ = 0) or y1∧y2
(if x˜ = 1). Upon receiving the privatized data, the central observer makes optimal decisions in each case.
Figure 2 illustrates how these two protocols compare in terms of average accuracy, where the accuracy is one
if the approximation is correct and zero if the approximation is incorrect. For ε = 0, both protocols cannot
do better than the best random guess of zero. which achieves average accuracy of 5/8 = 0.625. For large ε,
both protocols achieve the best accuracy of one.
Another example of multiple bit multi-party computation is studied in [31]. There are two parties each
owning two bits of data x ∈ {0, 1}2 and y ∈ {0, 1}2, and a third party wants to compute the Hamming
distance dH(x, y) =
∑2
i=1 |xi−yi|. Assuming each bit needs to be protected, the randomized response would
reveal each bit via Equation 9. On the other hand, we can design an interactive scheme where one party
reveals its two bits via the randomized response, and the other party then outputs its best estimate of the
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Figure 2: Interactive protocols can improve over the randomized response, when each party owns multiple
bits, for computing XOR or AND (left) and computing the Hamming distance (right).
Hamming distance obeying differential privacy guarantees, i.e.
P
(
y˜|x˜ = (0, 0), y = (0, 0) ) =

λ2
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 0
λ−1
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 1
1
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 2
P
(
y˜|x˜ = (0, 0), y = (0, 1) or (1, 0) ) =

λ
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 0
λ2−λ
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 1
λ
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 2
P
(
y˜|x˜ = (0, 0), y = (1, 1) ) =

1
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 0
λ−1
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 1
λ2
λ(1+λ) for y˜ = 2
where x˜ ∈ {0, 1}2 is the output of the first party via randomized response, and y˜ ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the output of
the second party. Figure 2 illustrates how these two protocols compare in terms of average accuracy, where
the accuracy is 2− |dH(x, y)− dˆ| where dˆ is the optimal decision made by the third party.
one if the approximation is correct and zero if the approximation is incorrect. For ε = 0, both protocols
cannot do better than the best random guess of zero. which achieves average accuracy of 5/8 = 0.625. For
large ε, both protocols achieve the best accuracy of one.
Approximate differential privacy. A common generalization of differential privacy, known as the ap-
proximate differential privacy, is to allow a small slack of δ ≥ 0 in the privacy condition[13, 14]. In the
multi-party context, a protocol P is (εi, δi)-differentially private for the i-th party if for all i ∈ [k], and all
xi, x
′
i ∈ {0, 1}, x−i ∈ {0, 1}k−1, and for all subset T ⊆ T ,
P(τ ∈ T |xi, x−i) ≤ eεiP(τ ∈ T |x′i, x−i) + δi . (21)
It is natural to ask if the linear programming (LP) approach presented in this paper can be extended
to identify the optimal multi-party protocol under {(εi, δi)}-differential privacy. The LP formulations of
(16) and (19) heavily rely on the fact that any differentially private protocol P can be decomposed as the
combination of the matrix S and the θ(y)’s. Since the differential privacy constraints are invariant under
scaling of P
(y)
τ , one can represent the scale-free pattern of the distribution with Sτ and the scaling with θ
(y)
τ .
This is no longer true for {(εi, δi)}-differential privacy, and the analysis technique does not generalize.
Correlated sources. When the data xi’s are correlated (e.g. each party observe a noisy version of the state
of the world), knowing xi reveals some information on other parties’ bits. In general, revealing correlated
16
data requires careful coordination between multiple parties. The analysis techniques developed in this paper
does not generalize to correlated data, since the crucial rank-one tensor structure of S
(y)
τ is no longer present.
Extensions to general utility functions. A surprising aspect of the main result is that even though the
worst-case accuracy is a concave function over the protocol P , the maximum is achieved at an extremal point
of the manifold of rank-1 tensors. This suggests that there is a deeper geometric structure of the problem,
leading to possible universal optimality of the randomized response for a broader class of utility functions. It
is an interesting task to understand the geometric structure of the problem, and to ask what class of utility
functions lead to optimality of the randomized response.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Corollary 3.10
Let X˜ denote the random output of the randomized response, and let f(X˜) denote the XOR of all k bits.
Notice that P (X, X˜) = (λk−dh(X,X˜))/(1 + λ)k where dh(·, ·) denotes the Hamming distance. For a given X˜
the decision is either f(X˜) or the complement of it. We will first show that f(X˜) is the optimal decision
rule.
It is sufficient to show that E[w(f(X), f(X˜))|X˜] ≥ E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))|X˜]. Since, E[w(f(X), f(X˜))|X˜] =∑
i even
(
k
i
)
λk−i/(1 + λ)k and E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))|X˜] = ∑i odd (ki)λk−i/(1 + λ)k, it follows that
E[w(f(X), f(X˜))|X˜]− E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))|X˜] = (λ− 1)k/(1 + λ)k ≥ 0 ,
since λ ≥ 1. By symmetry, the decision rule is the same for all X˜, and also for the worst case accuracy. This
finishes the desired characterization of the optimal accuracy.
To get the asymptotic analysis of the accuracy, notice that E[w(f(X), f(X˜))]+E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))] = 1 and
E[w(f(X), f(X˜))] +E[w(f(X), f¯(X˜))] = (λ− 1)k/(1 +λ)k = (eε− 1)k/(2 + (eε− 1))k = (1/2)kεk +O(εk+1).
It follows that E[w(f(X), f(X˜))] = 1/2 + (1/2)k+1εk +O(εk+1).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Consider the following half space for R2k . For an a ∈ {−1,+1}k, the half space Ha is defined as the set of
T ∈ R2k satisfying
(−1)k
( ∏
j∈[k]
aj
) ∑
x∈{0,1}k
(
Tx
∏
i∈[k]
(−λi)ai xi
)
≥ 0 . (22)
We claim that
P{λi} =
T ∈ ⋂
a∈{−1,+1}k
Ha
∣∣∣ T0...0 = 1
 .
It is straightforward to see that M{λi} is inside the intersection of all 2k half-spaces: all tensors in M{λi}
satisfy
(−1)k
( ∏
j∈[k]
aj
) ∏
i∈[k]
(
1− λaiti
)
≥ 0 ,
for all a ∈ {−1,+1}k. This immediately implies that the tensors satisfy (22). To show that it is indeed
the convex hull, we need to show that M{λi} intersects with the boundary of P{λi} at every corner point.
P{λi} as defined above is 2k − 1 dimensional polytope in 2k dimensional space, with at most 2k faces and 2k
corner points. Each corner point is an intersection of 2k − 1 half spaces and the one hyperplane defined by
T0...0 = 1.
Consider a corner point of M{λi} represented by a ∈ {−1,+1}k as
T (a) = [1 , λa11 ]⊗ · · · ⊗ [1 , λakk ] .
It follows that T (a) is an intersection of 2k − 1 half spaces Hb for b 6= a. Hence, every corner point of P{λi}
intersects with M{λi}. This finishes the proof.
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